The Forgotten Conflict: Sudan’s Invisible Crisis

By Alesha Uddin

In the vast desert of Sudan, a civil war rages on, yet the world appears to overlook its scale of suffering. Sudan is currently enduring one of the most severe humanitarian crises globally; however, international legal responses remain limited in both scope and effectiveness. This article argues that the Sudan conflict exposes structural constraints within the International Criminal Court (ICC). These importantly include restricted jurisdiction, reliance on state cooperation, and limited enforcement capacity, all of which undermine the court’s ability to deliver effective accountability.

Key Background: The Conflict in Sudan

Recent developments in the city of El Fasher in North Darfur, illustrate both the scale of the humanitarian crisis and the limits of international criminal law, particularly following its prolonged siege and eventual capture by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in late October 2025. The assault, fuelled by artillery and starvation, triggered reports of mass killings, summary executions and widespread violence.^[1] More than 70,000 people have fled their homes, while many remain without access to food or medical assistance.^[2]

Such conduct clearly falls within established categories of war crimes. The prohibition on the intentional starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is firmly embedded in both treaty law and customary international law, and is explicitly criminalised under Article 8 of the Rome Statute.^[3] As international criminal law scholars Dapo Akande and Emanuela-Chiara Gillard argue, the prohibition reflects a ‘long-standing norm of customary international law’ reinforced by treaty codification.^[4] The reported actions of the RSF therefore align with recognised offences within the ICC’s jurisdiction.

However, the persistence of such violations in Sudan demonstrates that clearly established legal prohibitions does not ensure effective enforcement. Despite falling within recognised categories of war crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction, these acts continue largely unabated, highlighting the court’s limited enforcement capacity, revealing a structural disconnect between its normative mandate and its practical ability to secure accountability.^[5]

The scale of the humanitarian crisis further reinforces this point. According to the United Nations, over 30 million people in Sudan require urgent assistance.^[6] In Darfur, famine conditions are increasingly imminent, while aid convoys continue to be obstructed, leaving entire communities surviving on leaves, grass or even animal fodder.^[7] The obstruction of humanitarian relief and the imposition of conditions of survival, may itself constitute an independent violation of international humanitarian law protections. However, despite the clarity of these legal prohibitions, the ICC has been unable to meaningfully disrupt ongoing conduct. This ongoing reality demonstrates that, even where conduct clearly falls within the court’s jurisdiction, its intervention remains largely reactive and temporally removed from the violations themselves, thereby restricting its capacity to mitigate ongoing harm or meaningfully influence conditions on the ground, a constraint arising from the ICC’s inherently retrospective form of justice.^[8]

Economic Drivers and Jurisdictional Gaps

A central factor sustaining the conflict and further exposing the limits of international criminal law is Sudan’s Gold economy. As one of Africa’s leading gold producers, Sudan generates substantial revenue for armed groups. Research by Chatham House identifies gold as the primary income stream for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and various affiliated networks.^[9] This economic dimension is legally significant, as it illustrates how resource exploitation underpins the commission of international crimes. While the ICC possesses jurisdiction over individuals responsible for core crimes, it lacks the authority to regulate or prosecute the broader economic networks that sustain them.

The RSF currently controls several major mining areas in the central and Southwestern regions, enabling it to extract and sell gold with minimal state oversight.^[10] Although official government figures reported ‘64 tonnes of gold’ produced in 2024, valued at ‘approximately $1.57 billion’, it is estimated that the majority of Sudan’s gold never enters formal export channels.^[11] Instead, between 70-80% is smuggled into neighbouring areas, where it is sold through informal markets.^[12] This demonstrates the existence of parallel financial systems operating beyond the reach of international criminal accountability.

External factors further contribute to the continuation of conflict. Reports suggest that foreign traders and refineries, particularly in the Gulf region, purchase Sudanese gold through these informal networks.^[13] This enables armed groups to convert gold into hard currency, reinforcing their ability to maintain conflict and resist political pressure. This raises broader jurisdictional challenges for international criminal law, as the ICC lacks authority over many transactional economic actors who indirectly facilitate the commission of core crimes, thereby confining accountability to individual perpetrators while leaving enabling structures largely unaddressed.^[14]

The International Criminal Court’s Investigation

The International Criminal Court (ICC) remains one of the few institutions formally engaged in investigating atrocities in Sudan. However, its role is defined as much by its limitations as by its mandate. In July 2025, Deputy Prosecutor Nazhat Shameem Khan informed the United Nations Security Council that there were ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that war crimes and crimes against humanity were ongoing in Darfur. This included citing the mass killings of over 40,000 people, after which Khan described the depth of suffering in Darfur as having ‘reached an intolerable state’.^[15] While this constitutes a formal recognition of ongoing violations, it simultaneously illustrates the gap between identification and enforcement within the ICC framework.^[16] This highlights the need for international responsibility and immediate attention.

The court’s investigative capacity is significantly constrained by its lack of access to territory. Ongoing conflict conditions prevent investigators from entering affected regions, forcing reliance on indirect evidence such as refugee testimonies, satellite imagery and reports from humanitarian organisations.^[17] This lack of territorial access significantly constrains evidentiary development.

Moreover, the Court’s jurisdiction in Sudan remains geographically confined to Darfur, excluding other regions experiencing similar patterns of violence.^[18] This restriction alters accountability and prevents the ICC from addressing the full scope of the crimes. As a result, the court’s intervention appears selection rather than comprehensive, further undermining its perceived legitimacy and effectiveness.

Restricted Jurisdiction

The conflict in Sudan exemplifies the inherent limitations of the ICC’s jurisdictional framework. Established under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, the court was designed to prosecute and deter genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. However, as William Schabas argues, the Court remains entirely dependent on state cooperation for arrests and evidence, leaving it without independent enforcement authority.^[19] Antonio Cassese similarly observed that international criminal justice risks becoming symbolic in the absence of political will.^[20] Within this context, restricted jurisdiction, limited access to territory and the absence of enforced arrest warrants highlight these structural weaknesses. This dependency enables key actors to evade accountability, particularly where they retain territorial or military control.

Reliance on State Cooperation

The court possesses no independent enforcement mechanism, relying entirely on states to execute arrest warrants, provide evidence, and facilitate investigations.^[21] Within this context, the dependency is problematic. Where state authorities are unwilling or unable to cooperate, often due to political instability in the conflict, ICC proceedings are effectively delayed. This creates an environment in which individuals are accused of serious international crimes can evade arrests by remaining within territories that refuse to comply with the court. This reliance reflects a fundamental tension within international criminal law; while the ICC aspires to operate as a supranational institution, it remains structurally embedded within a system of state of sovereignty. Consequently, the effectiveness of the court is contingent upon political will, rather than purely legal authority.^[22] This reinforces the notion that institutional dependence significantly undermines the ICC’s ability to deliver accountability.

In conclusion, the conflict in Sudan demonstrates that accountability for violations of international humanitarian law remains significantly constrained by structural limitations within the ICC framework. Restricted jurisdiction, limited access to territory, and reliance on state cooperation collectively undermine the Court’s effectiveness. While the ICC retains important normative value, its practical ability to prevent ongoing violations or secure timely accountability remains limited. This reinforces the need for doctrinal and institutional reform if international criminal law is to operate as an effective enforcement mechanism, rather than a primarily symbolic system.

References:

^[1] ‘ICC warns atrocities by paramilitary group in Sudan may constitute war crimes’ (ABC News, 3 November 2025) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-11-04/icc-says-rsf-atrocities-in-sudan-may-constitute-war-crimes/105967920> accessed 30 April 2026.

^[2] ‘Militia strikes kill at least 60 in Sudan displacement camp, says El Fasher group’ (The Guardian, 11 October 2025) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/11/militia-drone-strike-kills-people-at-displacement-shelter-in-sudan-says-local-group> accessed 30 April 2026.

^[3] Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, Art 8 (2)(b).

^[4] Dapo Akande, Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, ‘Conflict-induced Food Insecurity and the War Crime of Starvation of Civilians as a Method of Warfare’ (2019) 17 JICJ 733,757. < https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article-abstract/17/4/753/5681452> accessed 30 April 2026.

^[5] Sarah M.H Nouwen, Wouter G Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan’ (2010) 21 EJOIL 941, 965 < https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/21/4/941/418139> accessed 30 April 2026.

^[6]‘Sudan, ‘the most devastating humanitarian and displacement crisis in the world’ (United Nations News,14 February 2025) <https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160161> accessed 30 April 2026.

^[7] ‘Famine tightens grip on Sudan, with civilians trapped and aid blocked’ (United Nations News, 3 November 2025)<https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/11/1166253> accessed 30 April 2026.

^[8] W A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (5^th edn, CUP 2017).

^[9] ‘Gold and the war in Sudan’ (Chatham House, 26 March 2025) , Introduction and Section 1 <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/gold-and-war-sudan/01-introduction> accessed 30 April 2026.

^[10] ‘Sudan has vast oil, gold and agricultural resources. Who controls them?’ (Al Jazeera, 20 November 2025) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/20/sudan-has-vast-oil-gold-and-agricultural-resources-who-controls-them> accessed 30 April 2026.

^[11] ‘Sudan gold production jumps to 64 tonnes despite ongoing conflict’ (Sudan Tribune, 18 July 2025) <https://sudantribune.com/article/302984> accessed 30 April 2026.

^[12] ‘Sudan has vast oil, gold and agricultural resources. Who controls them? (Al Jazeera, 20 November 2025) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/20/sudan-has-vast-oil-gold-and-agricultural-resources-who-controls-them> accessed 30 April 2026.

^[13] ‘Sudan’s brutal civil war – what has happened in El Fasher?’ (The Guardian, 31 October 2025) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/oct/31/sudan-civil-war-el-fasher-explained> accessed 30 April 2026.

^[14] Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006) 271-272

^[15] ‘Crimes against humanity’ in Sudan’s Darfur: ICC deputy prosecutor’ (Al Jazeera, 11 July 2025) <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/11/crimes-against-humanity-in-sudans-darfur-icc-deputy-prosecutor> accessed 30 April 2026.

^[16] William A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (6^th edn, CUP 2020).

^[17] ‘ICC warns ‘the suffering is beyond words’ in Sudan’s Darfur’ (Vatican News, 11 July 2025) <https://www.vaticannews.va/en/world/news/2025-07/icc-warns-the-suffering-is-beyond-words-in-sudan-s-darfur.html> accessed 30 April 2026.

^[18] ‘ICC prosecutor seeks arrest warrants over atrocities in Darfur’ (The Guardian, 28 January 2025) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/jan/28/icc-prosecutor-seeks-arrest-warrants-over-accusations-of-darfur-atrocities> accessed 30 April 2026.

^[19] W A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (5^th edn, CUP 2017).

^[20] A Cassese, ‘The Role of Internationalized Courts and Tribunals in the Fight against International Criminality’, in Internationalized Criminal Courts: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia (OUP 2004).

^[21] W A Schabas, The International Politics of Mass Atrocities (1^st edn, Routledge 2010).

^[22] SM.H. Nouwen, Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan (EJOIL 21 4 November 2010) 941-960.